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Abstract
Online social networks offer unprecedented potential for rallying a large number of people to accomplish a given task. Here
we focus on information gathering tasks where rare information is sought through ‘‘referral-based crowdsourcing’’: the
information request is propagated recursively through invitations among members of a social network. Whereas previous
work analyzed incentives for the referral process in a setting with only correct reports, misreporting is known to be both
pervasive in crowdsourcing applications, and difficult/costly to filter out. A motivating example for our work is the DARPA
Red Balloon Challenge where the level of misreporting was very high. In order to undertake a formal study of verification,
we introduce a model where agents can exert costly effort to perform verification and false reports can be penalized. This is
the first model of verification and it provides many directions for future research, which we point out. Our main theoretical
result is the compensation scheme that minimizes the cost of retrieving the correct answer. Notably, this optimal
compensation scheme coincides with the winning strategy of the Red Balloon Challenge.
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Introduction
Social networks facilitate efficient and fast search for rare
information [1–6]. This is accomplished as individuals who are
already involved in the search, share their quest with their friends,
in effect referring them. We term this type of crowdsourcing
referral-based. Providing every member with incentives to recruit as
well as participate in the search opens enormous possibilities for
rallying people for a particular cause [7].
To this end, a scientific study of the power of social networks
and media to mobilize human populations was undertaken by the
United States Defense Advanced Project Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) in 2009. In the DARPA Network Challenge
(also known as the Red Balloon Challenge) 10 red weather
balloons were placed at undisclosed locations throughout the
United States. Participating teams competed to be the first to
locate all of the balloons and win a prize of $40,000. The lessons
learnt from the DARPA Network Challenge, both from the
scientific and practical standpoints, are almost solely drawn (with
few exceptions, e.g. [8]) from the different team strategies to
maximize the awareness and subsequent enrollment into the
search by the different competing teams [9]. These strategies
ranged from relying on people’s altruism to help in the search, to
web-based marketing to large communities of interest, to pure
financial incentives [9].
However, recruiting people is only half of the story. The other
half is distinguishing accurate balloon submissions from inaccurate
ones. For instance, the majority of submissions of balloon sightings
to the winning MIT team turned out to be false (either by sabotage
or by mistake), and the verification task turned out to be the most
challenging, time consuming, and likely the single most decisive
factor in the competition [10]. In MIT’s case, this task was
performed by a time-consuming mixture of common-sense geo-
location rules and direct verification by establishing direct
communication with the participants [9]. Whereas the MIT
recruitment mechanism has been described and analyzed in [7]
and further studied in [11], little is known about the adequacy/
optimality of its verification strategy, or any other team’s
approach.
In this paper, the crowdsourcing process is expanded to include
verification: i.e., the ability to check the accuracy of reports and to
filter out false ones. In other words, not only information
gathering, but also verification is crowdsourced helping filter out
false submissions before they reach the root. It is important to note
that the problem of verification is in no way specific to the
DARPA Network Challenge, but a subject of current research in
crowdsourcing tasks including content annotation [12–14], user
recommendations [15], and disaster relief [16].
In particular, this work initiates a formal study of verification in
crowdsourcing settings where information is propagated through
referrals. We propose a model which is simple and yet illustrates
issues that we believe remain salient in many realistic information
gathering scenarios such as maps of human-rights violations or
post-disaster damage reports. In our model, each referred
participant submits a false report with a given probability. Each
report can be verified at a cost by the person who referred the
reporting participant. Reports returned to the root may or may
not have been confirmed to be accurate. Should a false report
make its way to the root, the recruiter who failed to verify the
report is penalized. Within this model, we derive the compensation
scheme that minimizes the amount of reward necessary to recover
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the true answer. Notably, the optimal payment scheme is the same
as the
1
2
-split contract used by MIT in the DARPA Network
Challenge, though the team did not have the benefit of this
analysis in setting their actual strategy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We highlight the
need for verification using the DARPA Network Challenge as an
example. After that, we present a model incorporating false reports
and the possibility of verification. Analysis of the minimum
required reward and penalty follows together with a proof of the
optimality of the
1
2
-split/MIT contract. Finally, we review related
work and provide conclusions and directions for future work.
The DARPA Network Challenge
Our motivating example is the DARPA Network Challenge
[7,9]. This challenge required teams to provide coordinates of 10
red weather balloons placed at different locations in the
continental United States, offering a reward of $40,000 to the
first team to report all correct locations.
This large-scale mobilization required the ability to spread
information about the tasks widely and quickly, and to incentivize
individuals to act. The MIT team completed the challenge in
8 hours and 52 minutes. In approximately 36 hours prior to the
beginning of the challenge, the MIT team was able to recruit
almost 4,400 individuals through a recursive incentive mechanism.
The MIT team’s approach was based on the idea that achieving
large-scale mobilization towards a task requires diffusion of
information about the tasks through social networks, as well as
incentives for individuals to act, both towards the task and towards
the recruitment of other individuals. This was achieved through a
recursive incentive mechanism, which is illustrated in Figure 1. The
mechanism distributes up to $4,000 per balloon to people along
the referral path that leads to the balloon. The person who finds
the balloon gets $2,000, his immediate recruiter (or, parent) gets one
half of the finder’s compensation, etc. In Figure 1, agent a1 recruits
all of his neighbors, namely a2, a5 and a8, while agent a8 recruits
a6, who finds balloon y1. The finder receives
4,000
2
~2,000. Since
a8 recruited a6, it gets
4,000
22
~1,000. From this sequence, a1
receives
4,000
23
~500.
Likewise, looking at the left recruitment path, the finder receives
4,000
2
~2,000. As above, we have
4,000
22
~1,000 for a3 and
4,000
23
~500 for a2. From this sequence, a1 receives
4,000
24
~250.
Adding up its payments from the two sequences it initiated, a1
receives a total payment of 750. Notice that the amount
distributed to the agents never exceeds $4,000 per balloon. In
this example $3,500 was paid for the first balloon and $3,750 —
for the second. The MIT team donated the undistributed money
to charity.
The contracts described above can be dubbed split contracts,
specifying the percentage of total child’s reward that must be
passed back to the parent. In particular, the MIT’s winning
strategy used a 1
2
-split contract across all nodes.
However, as mentioned above, the MIT’s strategy assumed that
any balloon citing report is correct. Yet, in the actual challenge,
verifying balloon reports turned out to be a major obstacle [10].
Indeed, 124 out of 186 reports turned out to be false either by
sabotage or by mistake. Figure 2 shows all of the reported
locations, highlighting the prevalence of false reports in this kind of
time-critical task (see [9] for examples of misreports). In this paper,
we make a first attempt to model and tackle the verification
problem.
Results
Modeling Referral-Based Crowdsourcing
We model scenarios where the center has an information
gathering task. The information-seeking entity is represented by
Figure 1. Recruitment tree with two paths (shown in thick lines) initiated by a1 led to finding balloons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045924.g001
Figure 2. Reports of balloons sightings during the Red Balloon
Challenge. Ten big circles represent the true reports. The small circles
are for the false reports.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045924.g002
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the root of a tree, and each node in the tree holds the answer
required to complete the task with a fixed probability t.
Information about the task (or the question) is propagated through
referrals sent from parents to their children until a node holding
the answer is found. The nodes along the path are compensated to
ensure that once an answer-holding node is reached, it reports the
answer (thus, t is the probability of holding and returning the
answer). Unlike the other models, we allow for the possibility of
false reports.
A crucial modeling choice regards the cause of the false reports.
A rational agent that has no stake in the mechanism except for the
compensation received, has no incentive to lie as false reports
never result in a compensation. One may consider a richer
population of agents where some agents derive utility from the
mechanism not succeeding in recovering the true answer, or from
increasing the time until a true answer is discovered. Designing a
compelling utility function for this ‘‘lying’’ type of agent is an
option. However, in such models, false reporting can be overcome
by a payment that is high enough to make the agents’ utility from
truthful reporting a better option.
Given this, we pursue a different, simpler modeling avenue
which does not rely on agent utilities. Instead, with probability f
each node happens to be ‘‘irrational’’. Such a node does not hold
the true answer, but claims that he does and sends a false report to
its parent. In other words, f is the probability that the node does
not hold the answer and generates a false report. These irrational
agents are not affected by penalties and compensation: they lie
irrespective of the incentives. In this model, misreports cannot be
prevented but have to be discovered. Such a model of misreports is
consistent with ignorant rather than malicious behavior: e.g.,
misreports due to mistakes and noise. As we alluded to earlier,
modeling malicious behavior requires making assumption about
the utility functions of the malicious agents, and it remains an
avenue for future research. A good starting point may be the work
on spiteful bidding (e.g., see [17,18]).
As soon as a ‘‘reporting’’ node is recruited and generates an
answer (correct or mistaken), it can no longer recruit other nodes
as, from its point of view, the answer has already been recovered.
Therefore, a reporting node is always a leaf node and only leaf
nodes can generate false reports.
Now that we settled on how false reports arise, we need to
model the verification process. We are going to assume that a node
other than the reporter can verify the report with certainty.
Naturally, verification requires some effort which we model with
the cost e incurred by the node performing verification. Note that
under the ‘‘perfect’’ verification, it is sufficient to obtain just one
verification. The next question is which node should perform the
verification. The most immediate candidate is the parent of the
reporting node. After all, it is the parent node who decides which
children to invite, and it is reasonable to hold him accountable for
his invitees. Also, from the point of view of invited children, the
first point of task-related contact for them is the parent.
Furthermore, nobody except for the recruiter may have the
authority/ability to question the recruit.
Given the assumptions above, we model the sequence of events
next. A report goes from the reporting node to the node who
recruited it — its immediate parent in the referral tree. On
receiving a report, the immediate parent can verify whether the
report is correct incurring the cost e. If the report is verified to be
false, it is dropped. Otherwise, the immediate parent submits it
directly to the root. To encourage verification, we assume the
mechanism supports penalties. If a false report is propagated from
a leaf node v back to the root, the immediate parent of v has to pay
the penalty c. Penalizing the leaf node does not make sense as a
node submitting a false report is irrational and, thus, indifferent to
monetary incentives. Penalizing ancestors other than the imme-
diate parent is not fair as they cannot verify the report or control
its submission to the root.
Following [11], we propagate rewards using split contracts (we
discuss why the choice of split contracts is justified in the Related
Work section). Suppose node iz1 has the correct answer. Let
s0,s1,s2, . . . ,si refer to split contracts offered on the path from the
root node 0 to node iz1: i.e., the root offers s0-split to the first
node on the path, who offers s1-split to the second node, etc. The
fraction of the reward received by each node is shown in Table 1.
We will be concerned with incentivizing the immediate parent i
of the reporting node iz1 to participate and perform verification.
His share of the reward is (1{si{1)si. For example, under the
1
2
-
split contract, the parent of a reporting node receives a quarter of
the reward.
Optimal Mechanism
The model detailed above is specified by the probabilities of
false and true reports, the verification cost, the penalty level, the
reward provided by the root, and the split contract determining
allocation of the reward (see Table 2). While the first 3 parameters
are exogenous, the root is likely to have control over the penalty
level, as well as distribution of the reward. Clearly, it is in the root’s
interest to minimize the reward given out. In this section we derive
the split contract which minimizes the reward required to recover
the answer. We also describe the penalty level sufficient to ensure
that verification takes place and no false reports are propagated.
Recall that t and f refer to the probabilities of submitting true
and false answers respectively. These events are disjoint and the
probability that a report is correct is
t
tzf
. Let r denote the reward
offered by the root. Consider a reporting node iz1 and his parent
i. If the report is correct, the parent will receive (1{si{1)sir
resulting in the expected reward of
t
tzf
(1{si{1)sir. When
deciding on whether or not to verify the report, the parent must
consider the verification cost e, and the penalty c for propagating
false reports. Verification cost is incurred regardless of the report
accuracy, while the penalty is paid only if the report is false. The
utility of the parent performing verification appears on the left
hand side while the utility when no verification is performed is on
the right:
t
tzf
(1{si{1)sir{e§
t
tzf
(1{si{1)sir{
f
tzf
c ð1Þ
Thus, the parent prefers verifying the report when the verification
cost is below the expected penalty eƒ f
tzf
c.
Table 1. Distribution of the reward r under a split contract.
node 1 receives (1{s0)s1s2s3    si{1sir
node 2 receives (1{s1)s2s3    si{1sir
…
node i{1 receives (1{si{2)si{1sir
node i receives (1{si{1)sir
node iz1 receives (1{si)r
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045924.t001
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Proposition 1. For a fixed e, the minimum level of penalty that
enforces verification is
cmin~
tzf
f
e~(1z
t
f
)e ð2Þ
We say that the verification constraint is satisfied if the penalty is at
least the minimum penalty. Notice that whenever the constraint is
satisfied, verification will take place and no penalty will be
incurred.
Not surprisingly, the minimum penalty is proportional to
verification costs. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the required
penalty is highest when almost all reports are true: i.e., when the
ratio
t
f
is high. The reason for this is that from the point of view of
the parent, verification is going to be a wasted effort as there is a
high probability the report is true. Viewed differently, the chances
of being penalized for propagating an unverified report are small.
Thus, the penalty must be high enough to counteract these effects
and eliminate all incorrect submissions.
Verification is most important when the number of false reports
is large relative to the number of true reports. For example, during
the Red Balloon Challenge, the MIT team received 186 reports
with only 62 being true (see Figure 2). A high number of false
reports is likely in scenarios where the answer is difficult to locate
requiring a large number of nodes to be explored. Note that these
are exactly the scenarios relevant to referral-based crowdsourcing.
The expected number of reports until a true report is submitted is
given by the mean
tzf
t
of the geometric random variable specified
by the success probability of
t
tzf
. For example, when t~f 2, the
expected number of false reports is
fzf 2
f 2
{1~
1
f
.
The minimum penalty level provides incentives for the agents to
verify the report rather than propagate it directly. However the
agents have another option, which is to not participate at all. In
order to encourage participation, the reward has to be high
enough as we discuss in the next paragraph. First, we observe that
a parent node also has an option to ignore a report that needs
verification in the hope that the answer will be found and verified
by other nodes deeper down his subtree. We assume this strategy
never leads to a positive payoff (for example, this is the case if the
reporting node complains that his report is held due to the parent’s
reluctance to verify, resulting in the parent being disqualified).
To encourage participation (assuming the verification constraint
(1) is satisfied), the parent’s expected utility must be non-negative
t
tzf
(1{si{1)sir{e§0; i.e., the expected reward must exceed
the effort. Rearranging the terms of this inequality, we get the
following participation constraint for node i.
Proposition 2. The minimum reward sufficient to encourage
participation of node i is
rmini ~e
tzf
(1{si{1)sit
~
e
(1{si{1)si
(1z
f
t
) ð3Þ
Not surprisingly, higher verification costs require higher rewards.
In contrast to the minimum penalty, the required reward increases
with the ratio of false reports to true reports
f
t
(i.e., decreases with
t
f
). Intuitively, the required reward is proportional to the cost of
verification incurred before a true answer is found. When the
probability of false reports is high relative to the probability of true
reports, the total verification effort spent before a true answer is
discovered is high. The proposition above assumes the root never
receives more than one true report at the same time, and once the
true report is received, all nodes are immediately made aware of it
and do not incur any costs by performing verification after that.
Multiple true reports can be allowed without affecting the
incentives by compensating nodes along each path independently.
Of course, this means spending the required reward multiple
times, once for each true report.
The reward required to satisfy the participation constraint (3)
for the parent of a reporting node iz1 is inversely proportional to
the fraction (1{si{1)si of the reward that the parent receives. If
we knew a priori which nodes would be reporting answers, we could
minimize the required reward by giving all of it to the immediate
parents (immediate parents are the only nodes with non-trivial
verification and participation constraints as only they can perform
verification and incur penalties). However, any node could be the
immediate parent, and contracts must be designed without
knowing which nodes will initiate a report. In other words, the
participation constraint must be satisfied for any node
r§rmini for all nodes i ð4Þ
Notice that unlike the results for the other referral models [11,19],
the reward does not depend on the depth to which the tree needs
to be explored. This is due to the lack of cost for propagating the
answer – which may be a more realistic assumption.
Next we find the contract that minimizes the required reward r.
The Optimal Split Contract. The MIT mechanisms (i.e.,
1
2
-
split) is a special case of the family of split-contract mechanisms.
While intuitively the
1
2
-split seems to be the most natural one, no
theoretical guarantees on its performance have previously been
provided. We do this here. As we will show, in the context of our
model, the
1
2
-split mechanism is the optimal split-contract
mechanism.
Theorem 1. The
1
2
-split contract minimizes the reward required to
recover the answer.
Proof. Suppose node iz1 returns the true answer and recall
the corresponding distribution of the reward in Table 1. We are
free to choose the values for s1, . . . ,si that minimize the required
reward subject to the participation constraint. Specifically, at the
time the contract is offered to node j on the path to node i, it must
hold that r§ e
(1{sj{1)sj
(1z
f
t
). The required reward is inversely
Table 2. Symbol list.
Symbol Meaning
t Probability that a node has the answer
f Probability of a node generating a false report
e Verification cost
c Penalty for submitting a false report
r Reward offered by the root node
sj{1 Percentage of its reward that node j must pass to parent j{1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045924.t002
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proportional to (1{sj{1)sj . Also, observe that the constraint must
hold for any j, and thus, the required reward is determined by the
node j with the lowest share (1{sj{1)sj . Formally, the reward
required by a contract (s1, . . . ,si) is given by the minimum value x
that satisfies
(1{sj{1)sj§x V1ƒjƒi
In fact, a split-contract must specify shares si for any i[Z, since the
mechanism must return the true answer no matter how deep in the
tree it is found.
(1{sj{1)sj§x Vj[Z ð5Þ
It is easy to see that x~
1
4
for the
1
2
-split mechanism (i.e.,
sj~
1
2
Vj). Next we show that no other mechanism can have a
higher performance guarantee. Suppose x~
1
4
ze for ew0.
Constraints (5) can be written as
sj§
x
1{sj{1
~
1
4
1{sj{1
z
e
1{sj{1
§
1
4
1{sj{1
ze
We used sj[½0,1 to obtain the last inequality. Observe that
1
4
1{si{1
§si{1 for si{1[½0,1 to obtain
sj§sj{1ze
Since the above inequality holds for all j, we get
sj§s0zje
But for any ew0 this results in sjw1 for jw
1
e
violating the
constraint sj[½0,1. Thus, eƒ0 and xƒ 1
4
, establishing optimality
of the
1
2
-split.
Discussion
Related Work
Our work can be seen as an application of mechanism design
[20] to social networks and information gathering tasks. The
model has similarities to the model of Query Incentive Networks
(QIN) presented by Kleinberg and Raghavan [19]. In that model,
the root needs to recover an answer from a network of nodes
where each node has a small probability of holding the answer. In
order to encourage nodes to return the answer, the root proposes a
reward that is propagated down the tree. Once an answer-holding
node is recruited, it sends the answer to its parent, who forwards it
to the grandparent, and so on until the root is reached. There is a
constant (integer-valued) cost incurred by each node on the path
from the answer-holding node back to the root. The authors
describe the minimum reward required to obtain the answer with
high probability when each parent can offer a reward to its
children.
Our model is similar to the QIN model in that we are searching
to retrieve an answer from the network where the question is
propagated via invitations that parents send to their children. The
main novel ingredients in our model are (i) the possibility of false
reports; (ii) the option to verify the reports at a cost; and (iii) the
ability of the root to penalize false report submissions. These
attributes appear in many real-world settings making our model
more readily applicable.
It is interesting to note that the introduction of costly verification
and penalties allowed us to dispense with one of the assumptions of
the QIN model: the costly propagation of the answer is no longer
required. Without this assumption, the QIN model admits
degenerate solutions, where the root gets the answer for an
arbitrarily small cost (indeed, the required reward would also be
zero in our model if we set the probability of false reports to zero).
Our disposal of this assumption is important, for example in
situations where propagating the answer has negligible cost (e.g.,
forwarding an email or re-tweeting) relative to a demanding
verification task (e.g., checking if a balloon report is authentic by
personally sighting it), or when the nodes can send the answer
directly to the root without propagating it up the referral path.
Our model restricts attention to split contracts. However, this
seems to be the right class of contracts to focus on for the following
reasons. The simplest and most common alternative is fixed
rewards: each parent promises its children a fixed amount. While
original work on QIN considered fixed contracts [19], Cebrian et
al. [11] showed that a significantly lower reward is required when
using split contracts. Also, in our setting, where verification and
recovery of the answer must occur with certainty, fixed contracts
are inappropriate: any contract that offers a fixed amount to each
node will require an infinite investment to be recovered with
probability one as the answer may be arbitrarily deep within the
tree. Another natural idea is to share the reward equally among all
the nodes along the path. In this context, this division of the
reward coincides with the Shapley value [21]. However, such a
division would also require an infinite reward in our model: for an
answer that is d levels deep, the root would have to pay each of the
d nodes along the path the minimum reward that a node will
expect to undertake verification. Notice that d may be arbitrarily
large.
Another justification of split contracts comes from the work of
Emek et al. [22]. The authors take an axiomatic approach to show
that a special case of split contracts with an equal split at each level
arises naturally in multi-level marketing. Similar to our model, in
multi-level marketing recursive referrals are sought from the
participants. A fundamental difference is that in the marketing
model participants are compensated for each referral they make,
while in QIN and our context, only referrals that contribute to
finding the answer generate a reward.
We acknowledge that in reality recruitment trees are finite and
potentially not very deep, while our assumption is that propagation
of referrals can produce arbitrarily deep trees, reaching very large
(possibly infinite) numbers of individuals. Indeed, recent work
suggests that we live in a ‘‘small but slow world’’, as social network
topology and human burstiness can actually hinder information
propagation, effectively reducing the population reached [23–28].
However, as the DARPA Network Challenge showed, wide
dissemination of information does occur in certain scenarios [29–
33].
Conclusions and Future Work
Since the seminal experiments by social psychologist Stanley
Milgram in the 1960s, it has been established that social networks
are very effective at finding target individuals through short paths
Verification in Referral-Based Crowdsourcing
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[1]. Various explanations of this phenomenon have been given
[3,4,6,34]. However, it has also been recognized that the success of
social search requires individuals to be motivated to actually
conduct the search and participate in the information diffusion.
Indeed, it has been shown experimentally that while successful
chains happen to be short, the majority of chains observed
empirically terminate prematurely [5]. Dodds et al. conclude that
‘‘although global social networks are, in principle, searchable, actual success
depends sensitively on individual incentives’’ [5]. In other words, a key
challenge in social search is the incentive challenge. However, while
models like the Query Incentive Networks model [19], and the
split-contract approach [7] both provide incentives for diffusion,
the problem of verifying the received reports has not previously
received any formal treatment.
The issue of verification arises in many real-world crowdsour-
cing scenarios (e.g., mapping social uprisings [35,36] or gathering
disaster response requests [37,38]). Indeed, some competitive
scenarios have even been subject to larger levels of sabotage, as
illustrated by the attack on the crowdsourced strategy to tackle the
2011 DARPA Shredder Challenge [39]. For such settings, our
paper provides the first steps towards formally analyzing verifica-
tion schemes. Specifically, we introduced a model for studying
verification in referral-based crowdsourcing. We explored the
relationship between various parameters, including the size of the
reward offered by the mechanism, the probability of possessing the
answer, the probability of false reports, the cost of verifying the
correctness of reports, and the penalty imposed by the mechanism
on false reports. Our main theoretical result is the proof that the
optimal distribution of the reward in our model is given by the 1
2
-
split contract. This contract happened to be the one used by the
winner of the Red Balloon Challenge, showing that this way of
sharing the reward is also appealing in practice. Our paper
provides the first theoretical justification of this mechanism in the
presence of misinformation. Our second contribution is in
initiating a formal study of verification in information-gathering
scenarios. Our model provides a starting point for future research
where various assumptions may be relaxed. We outline some
directions next.
We provided results for the uniform and known verification
cost. Bitcoin provides an example of a real system where this
assumption holds: the expected computational cost of authorizing
a transaction is uniform and known (see [40] for more details on
Bitcoin). In other scenarios such as quality verification of
crowdsourced tasks (e.g., accuracy of a translation, deciding
whether a photo is authentic, or evaluating a programming job)
costs may be heterogeneous as well as the private information of
the agents. Our model can be directly extended to introduce
heterogeneous and private costs for the analysis of such scenarios.
In online scenarios one may easily create multiple identities.
Thus, it is particularly important to consider mechanisms that are
resilient to coalitions of lying nodes. Since coalitions may easily
control an entire referral path, verification from nodes outside the
path is likely to be required. This question has been tackled with
‘‘uniform’’ rather than split contracts in [40]. Moreover, for split-
contracts, some lessons may be drawn from the results on false-
name-proof mechanisms for multi-level marketing [22].
It is also interesting to weaken some of our other modeling
assumptions. For example, if we no longer assume that the
probability that a node holds the answer (or lies) is uniform, the
mechanism should encourage the recruitment of individuals more
likely to possess the answer, perhaps based on the knowledge that
agents have about the abilities and reliability of their peers. An
even more selective recruitment is likely to arise if the cost of
recruiting others is non-zero.
Our model makes the assumption that the split contract (e.g.,
1
2
-
split) is selected by the mechanism and cannot be modified by
other nodes. This contrasts with the models of [11,19], where each
node chooses which contract to offer to its children, and the
resulting equilibrium contract is analyzed. An important direction
for further study, therefore, is to perform equilibrium analysis in
our model, when nodes not only choose who to recruit and
whether to verify, but also what split to offer.
Finally, an important extension of our work is to explore the
dynamics of strategic behavior in the context of repeated
interaction. In particular, a threat of non-monetary punishment
may be sufficient to encourage verification. For example, in
permanent systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, Wikipedia
or Bitcoin, the penalty may be imposed in the form of decreased
reputation, which diminishes future earning potential or the
influence a user exercises [41].
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